OpinionPREMIUM

GERALD BYLEVELD l To save our wildlife, track the cash spoor

Catching poachers on the ground is all very well, but the only way to end the illegal trade is to go after the money men at the top

Money laundering — disguising the origins of illegally obtained funds — enables traffickers to convert cash from wildlife products into what appears to be legitimate income, says the writer. File photo. (Charles Platiau)

South Africa’s transport infrastructure, sophisticated financial system and extensive wildlife resources make it both a prime source and a transit point for the illegal wildlife trade.

But poachers and smugglers are only one layer of a multibillion-rand enterprise. Behind them are financiers, exporters, lawyers and money managers who ensure that illicit proceeds can circulate undetected through the legitimate economy.

These financial facilitators are the invisible scaffolding of the illegal wildlife market. Yet only a fraction of such cases result in charges being brought against financial facilitators.

A 2023 UN Office on Drugs & Crime study in the Asia–Pacific region found that only 1% of wildlife crime cases involved a money laundering investigation, and only 7% led to prison sentences.

Money laundering — disguising the origins of illegally obtained funds — enables traffickers to convert cash from wildlife products into what appears to be legitimate income. In wildlife crime, laundering typically occurs through several overlapping techniques.

Cash smuggling and layering are the simplest and most common. Syndicates collect large amounts of physical cash from buyers in Asia or local intermediaries and move it across borders in small increments, often through informal financial systems. Once split and layered through multiple transactions, the trail becomes difficult to trace.

Syndicates collect large amounts of physical cash from buyers in Asia or local intermediaries and move it across borders in small increments, often through informal financial systems.

Front companies and shell businesses also play a central role. Entities registered as export firms, tourism operators, or hunting outfitters can disguise illicit transactions as part of ordinary business operations.

A legitimate game farm, for example, can hide illegal horn sales within a web of legal animal product exports. Legitimate cash-intensive businesses, such as casinos, knowingly or unknowingly, allow syndicates to launder their ill-got cash into apparently legitimate “winnings” — often in large quantities.

Trade-based money laundering — the manipulation of invoices to hide value transfers — is another method. A company may overstate or understate the value of goods shipped abroad, effectively moving money under the guise of trade. This technique exploits weaknesses in customs oversight and is especially effective in sectors such as seafood, leather and curios, which overlap with wildlife products.

Finally, traffickers invest laundered profits in tangible assets such as real estate, luxury vehicles or guest lodges. Once the money is tied to visible property, it appears legitimate. The result is a criminal economy that seeps into the formal one, distorting local markets and shielding offenders behind layers of ownership and paperwork.

If money laundering cleans dirty profits, bribery ensures the system continues undisturbed. Bribes lubricate nearly every stage of the wildlife trafficking chain, from poaching in source countries to import into destination countries.

At the source, game and field rangers are often bribed or coerced into turning a blind eye. Syndicates may offer payment or protection in exchange for information on patrol routes, security gaps or the locations of high-value animals. The same pattern extends to customs and border officials, who can falsify documentation or permit consignments to pass unchecked.

Institutionally, corruption undermines governance. When the officials tasked with protecting wildlife or enforcing the law are compromised, public trust collapses

Corruption infects investigative and judicial processes. There have been repeated instances where charges against traffickers are delayed, evidence is misplaced or penalties are reduced due to alleged bribery or political interference. Such manipulation erodes public confidence and signals to criminal groups that enforcement can be negotiated.

Bribery is not limited to the public sector. Private-sector enablers — freight companies, shipping agents, and financial intermediaries — may also accept payment to mislabel goods or overlook suspicious transactions. This blend of private complicity and public corruption creates a powerful shield of impunity.

The costs of money laundering and bribery extend well beyond biodiversity loss. Financially, laundered wildlife proceeds are often reinvested into other illicit markets, including narcotics and human trafficking. Organised crime groups exploit wildlife trafficking networks as low-risk, high-reward ventures that diversify their revenue streams.

Institutionally, corruption undermines governance. When the officials tasked with protecting wildlife or enforcing the law are compromised, public trust collapses. Communities dependent on tourism or sustainable wildlife use lose confidence in the government, while honest businesses face unfair competition from actors funded by criminal capital.

Economically, the influx of illicit money can inflate property prices and distort local economies, particularly in regions adjacent to parks or coastal areas. The environmental, social, and fiscal consequences are interlinked — weakening the state’s ability to deliver services, conserve biodiversity, and attract ethical investment.

In response to the scale of the challenge, South Africa now explicitly recognises wildlife crime as a form of organised financial crime. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Fica) provides a framework for tracking suspicious financial transactions, and co-operation between the Financial Intelligence Centre, the South African Revenue Service, the department of forestry, fisheries & environment and the Hawks has improved. The national integrated strategy to combat wildlife trafficking explicitly calls for a “follow-the-money” approach.

Investigations into financial flows require specialised skills and co-ordination across agencies that often operate in silos.

The arrest of Francis Kipampa in 2023 and his conviction on rhino horn trafficking and money laundering charges in Mpumalanga showcase what can be achieved through interagency and private-public collaboration. Operation Apex, launched by US law enforcement, dismantled a decade-long wildlife and drug money laundering operation. In Malawi, the Lin-Zhang network was convicted in April 2023 for money laundering derived from trafficking rhino horn, ivory and pangolin scales.

Yet formidable challenges remain. Many wildlife transactions occur in cash-heavy rural areas, beyond the reach of formal banking oversight. Investigations into financial flows require specialised skills and co-ordination across agencies that often operate in silos. Prosecutorial capacity to investigate complex financial crimes is limited, and asset forfeiture proceedings can be lengthy and contested.

To dismantle trafficking networks, enforcement must pivot from catching the foot soldiers to targeting financial and institutional enablers.

Priority reforms include:

  • strengthening financial-intelligence sharing among banks, regulators and conservation agencies;
  • building asset-tracing and recovery expertise;
  • improving transparency around company ownership; and
  • investing in communities to reduce the allure of poaching and corruption by creating viable livelihoods and equitable conservation benefits.

Because trafficking is inherently transnational, regional and global collaboration is essential.

The illegal wildlife trade is not only an ecological crisis but a financial and governance one. Every seized horn or intercepted wildlife shipment represents only a tactical win.

Lasting success depends on making wildlife crime unprofitable by exposing financial trails, prosecuting facilitators and restoring integrity to the institutions designed to protect society and the natural world.

Until the money stops flowing, the killing will continue.

Byleveld is a former head of financial crime compliance at Investec and head of the IWT expert working group within the South African Anti-Money Laundering Integrated Taskforce

Business Times


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