OpinionPREMIUM

KOFFI KOUAKOU | Chinese science-fiction classic offers stark warning for SA

South Africa finds itself in a geopolitical ‘three-body problem’ as it orbits three major centres of power

President Cyril Ramaphosa and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China
President Cyril Ramaphosa and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China. File photo. (Elmond Jiyane, GCIS​)

The Three-Body Problem is a science-fiction novel — now also a television adaptation — by the Chinese author Liu Cixin.

At first glance it appears to belong firmly in the realm of speculative fiction: alien civilisations, cosmic time scales and abstract physics. Yet its deeper power lies elsewhere. The novel uses hard science and philosophy to interrogate a profoundly political question: how do civilisations behave when stability collapses and survival becomes uncertain?

The title refers to a long-standing problem in physics. Predicting the motion of two celestial bodies interacting through gravity is relatively straightforward. Introduce a third, and the system becomes chaotic. Orbits destabilise, trajectories shift unpredictably and small disturbances produce disproportionate consequences. Over time, such systems rarely settle into equilibrium.

In Liu’s trilogy this scientific dilemma becomes a metaphor for civilisations trapped in unstable systems — systems where moral certainty erodes, trust becomes dangerous and long-term survival requires uncomfortable choices.

For South Africa, and increasingly for many emerging middle powers, this metaphor feels uncomfortably close to reality.

South Africa today finds itself in a geopolitical three-body problem, orbiting three major centres of global power: the US, China and Russia. Each exerts gravitational pull. Each offers economic, diplomatic or ideological incentives. None offers predictability or long-term stability.

South Africa’s foreign policy tensions of recent years are not merely the product of indecision or ideological confusion. They are symptoms of a system in which equilibrium is structurally elusive

The US draws South Africa towards a liberal international order built on markets, democratic norms and rule-based institutions. Yet this attraction is increasingly accompanied by strategic impatience, moral conditionality and selective enforcement of those very rules.

On the other hand, China’s pull is economic and developmental — manifest in trade, infrastructure and industrial ambition — but it also brings asymmetric dependencies and long-term leverage.

Finally, Russia, though economically weaker, exerts symbolic and security-orientated gravity, appealing to narratives of sovereignty, resistance and opposition to Western dominance.

In a simpler world, alignment might be manageable. In a three-body system, it becomes inherently unstable. Small diplomatic gestures can provoke outsized reactions. Strategic ambiguity becomes both a shield and a liability. Stability proves fleeting.

South Africa’s foreign policy tensions of recent years are not merely the product of indecision or ideological confusion. They are symptoms of a system in which equilibrium is structurally elusive.

Across much of the Global South, including within the Brics grouping, multipolarity is increasingly presented as an emancipatory alternative to Western dominance. Multiple centres of power, the argument goes, expand choice, restore sovereignty and dilute hegemonic pressure.

Yet The Three-Body Problem offers a challenging and sobering corrective. More gravitational forces do not necessarily produce balance. They often produce chaos.

Historically, multipolar systems have been among the most volatile. They are prone to miscalculation, shifting alliances and pre-emptive action driven by fear rather than trust. For states without overwhelming economic or military power, such systems can be especially dangerous.

The risk for South Africa is not alignment with one power or another. It is the belief that skilful balancing alone guarantees security in an increasingly competitive and fragmented world.

One of Liu Cixin’s most unsettling contributions is the “Dark Forest” theory. In it, the universe is imagined as a forest in which every civilisation is a hunter. Survival is the primary objective. Intentions cannot be verified. Revealing one’s position invites destruction. Silence becomes strategy.

As a metaphor, the Dark Forest resonates deeply with contemporary geopolitics. Power asymmetries endure. International norms are unevenly applied. Transparency often exposes vulnerability rather than fostering trust. Co-operation persists, but always under the shadow of competition.

For African states, this is not a hypothetical future. It is a lived condition. Resource endowments invite external extraction. Institutional weakness invites intervention. Openness without leverage frequently results in dependency rather than partnership.

In such an environment, visibility is not inherently virtuous. It is vulnerability and can be dangerous.

The lesson South Africa might draw from The Three-Body Problem is not despair, but what might be called anticipatory realism. This is the practice of governing with the assumption that the future will not be benign by default.

Anticipatory realism rejects the comfort of short-termism. It insists on planning beyond electoral cycles and diplomatic rituals. It recognises that co-operation is fragile, institutions are under strain, and technological acceleration — particularly in AI, energy systems and surveillance — will reward resilience over rhetoric.

In unstable systems, credibility follows capability. Moral leadership without material resilience is easily marginalised. Strategic patience matters more than performative alignment.

South Africa’s future will be shaped less by which bloc it claims to belong to than by whether it can build the internal coherence necessary to withstand external shocks. That is both a challenge and an opportunity to contemplate.

‘The Three-Body Problem’ ultimately asks a question that modern geopolitics often sidesteps: what if the future is structurally hostile? Liu Cixin’s answer is unsettling but clear. Only those who anticipate instability survive long enough to shape outcomes

Today, much of global development discourse assumes a linear progression: economic growth leads to stronger institutions, which in turn sustain democracy and rights. History offers a less reassuring story.

Development achieved without resilience is reversible. Sovereignty rights asserted without power are fragile. Institutions built without strategic autonomy are vulnerable to external pressures.

South Africa’s long-term challenge is not simply economic growth but what might be called healthy development — development grounded in institutional strength, social cohesion and ubuntu (my humanity is bound to yours), strategic autonomy, and narrative confidence. Without these foundations, progress remains precarious in an increasingly volatile global system.

In Liu Cixin’s universe, civilisations collapse not because they lack ideals and ideas, but because they lack the capacity to survive instability. Nations are no exception.

Three lessons stand out:

  • First, balance is not a strategy unless it is underwritten by capability. Diplomatic agility cannot substitute for economic diversification, energy security, technological competence and credible state institutions.
  • Second, selective opacity is sometimes necessary. In competitive systems, radical transparency can expose vulnerabilities rather than build trust. Visibility can lead to vulnerability. This is not an argument for secrecy as a principle but for disciplined stewardship of strategic assets, including data, minerals, infrastructure and long-term policy intent.
  • Third, survival precedes virtue. Ethical governance cannot endure without resilience. Values are not abandoned when states invest in their own durability; they are preserved.

The Three-Body Problem ultimately asks a question that modern geopolitics often sidesteps: what if the future is structurally hostile? Liu Cixin’s answer is unsettling but clear. Only those who anticipate instability survive long enough to shape outcomes.

For South Africa, and for many emerging middle powers, the coming decades will not reward ideological purity or rhetorical defiance. They will reward foresight, strategic discipline, and the courage to confront uncomfortable realities — anticipatory realism.

In a world of three geopolitical suns, stability is never given. It must be engineered for the best outcomes.

Those who mistake chaos for freedom may find themselves cast adrift, marginalised and discarded as irrelevant.

• Kouakou is a member of the OECD Foresight Expert Group, a strategic foresight practitioner, and an analyst of African and Global South geopolitics


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