The 2024 national and provincial elections are wide open. There is the possibility of a hung National Assembly in parliament. The unimaginable is now almost an imminent possibility – the ANC losing power. Some people suggest that President Cyril Ramaphosa has a searching question to respond to: “Will the ANC die in my hands?” The alternative question for me: “Is the ANC still alive?”
The pressing issue for the country is to map scenarios for a life beyond the ANC in government. The organisation is falling apart from within. The factional configuration of the ANC has reached a point of paralysis unless one faction were to break away.
There is no possibility for peacemaking; any unity pact henceforth will be a ruse bound to collapse in the very near future. ANC members and leaders have no ability for healthy dissent. Some have a yearning to inflict pain on the other, with all comradely pretence lost in the battle for the carcass (not soul) of the ANC.
The 2021 local government elections have been a watershed moment for SA’s democracy, with the country firmly headed to coalition governments in some provinces and possibly at the National Assembly in 2024. How will stable coalition governments be formed?
This calls for innovative electoral reforms that are far more radical than the Constitutional Court's ruling allowing independent candidates to contest in national and provincial elections.
I believe we no longer need provinces as a sphere of government; we should abolish them and look to Kenya’s devolution model to strengthen district municipalities while reconfiguring some aspects of the local government sphere, potentially converting local municipalities into administrative entities.
This would leave political representation at the district level. If provinces remain, then there should be direct elections for the premiers and, by extension, the president.
The current system of premiers and a president voted for by the legislature is not going to serve us well. If people directly elect the president, for example, section 102 of the constitution (enabling a motion of no confidence in the president or cabinet) would have to fall away because the National Assembly can’t lose confidence in a president it did not vote for.
Section 89 (our version of the impeachment clause) can remain as a tool for parliament to hold the president accountable. Section 89 has a higher standard — strict on conditions to trigger such a motion and robust in its demand for a two-thirds majority to succeed.
We are faced with a momentous opportunity to truly embody the ethos “all power to the people”. If the president were to be directly elected it would necessitate flexibility in the composition of the cabinet. Currently the demand for the president to appoint ministers and deputy ministers from the National Assembly is restrictive in terms of searching for the most patriotic, skilled and knowledgeable South Africans to lead in government.
Yes, the president can appoint up to two people who are not members of the National Assembly, but this will not be adequate in future. The president should be free to appoint widely. The best members of the executive can’t possibly all be found in parliament — this concentrates too much power in political parties.
Some might fancy that the ANC could renew and reverse its losses. This is near impossible. In Ramaphosa the ANC has a leader who has no clear political programme for the party and prefers to invest his energies in state responsibilities.
For this reason, as ANC president, Ramaphosa has not managed to rebuild structures (regions and provinces) that collapsed ahead of the 2017 Nasrec conference or in its aftermath. Instead, the ANC continues to weaken organisationally. Some point to a cleanup campaign but a political programme that hollows out organisational structures with no ability to rebuild them will lead to disastrous outcomes.
It came as a surprise to some when the ANC lost its majority in eThekwini. Not me. The ANC region in that city is bedevilled by factionalism and infighting. There was no solid ANC elections machinery.
At this rate, by 2024 the ANC will have collapsed organisationally, making it difficult to contest elections as a cohesive force.
Ramaphosa’s popularity will continue to diminish as long as the perception that he is a weak, overly consultative and indecisive leader remains. Ramaphosa will have the ANC die in his hands unless he changes his leadership style and builds cohesive ANC structures while accelerating economic reforms. If he fails to achieve this, South Africans must prepare for life beyond the ANC.
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