The world has a democracy problem. The engine room of its security policy, the UN Security Council, represents only five countries permanently, to the exclusion of the rest of the world. These countries — China, France, Russia, the UK and the US — have a stranglehold on international security and together have been the single greatest obstacle to advances in the way of realising true international community.
Their permanent seats are the product of the end of World War 2, in which they were the victors, and reflect the late colonialism and imperialism of the 1940s. Being the only permanent members of the Security Council, each of them individually possesses veto power over any initiative tabled.
Many have used this whenever proposed resolutions have threatened their interests or those of their allies. Their status has also allowed them to solidify and monopolise their nuclear power status. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 prevented any other country from acquiring the weapons, leaving them as the only legitimate nuclear states in the world. Membership is also often brandished as a bargaining chip by five states with increasingly little in the way of appeal or normative leadership globally.
The veto power essentially means the Security Council is gutted of any actual power unless all five countries’ interests are aligned or the resolution tabled before it is sufficiently vague or meaningless as not to threaten them. Second, regions that are not represented are at the mercy of the five powers when their interests coalesce enough for them to act. Third, the permanent five, as they are called, have cushioned themselves from any consequence for their actions, even when international law dictates that they should be held accountable.
Membership of the Security Council is often brandished as a bargaining chip by five states with increasingly little in the way of appeal or leadership
Poor countries have been at the receiving end of the last two of these machinations. For example, while the Security Council is tasked with initiating action against war crimes and referring these to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution, this has been done only in the case of Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, despite US and UK leaders being responsible for destruction and the deaths of millions in Iraq as part of a war they set on that country under false information. Incidentally, the ICC has charged only African people, a process clearly the product more of power imbalances than of the objective pursuit of justice.
Against these harsh realities, Africa has taken measures to reform the Security Council. The continent’s blueprint for the transformation of the council is known as the eZulwini Consensus. Reached collectively in the namesake town in Eswatini in 2005, the consensus reflects the continent’s desire to get a seat at the table. The AU correctly observed that the UN is skewed towards the north Atlantic (with three member states), China and Russia. This has left the vast majority of humanity without representation.
One of the AU’s proposals is for the inclusion of at least two permanent members from Africa in addition to the continent's three rotating seats. Yet these proposals have not gone anywhere. Part of the problem is that Africa is not alone in being slighted, so that other continents, including the economically dynamic Asia, and South America, are not represented. This collective slighting has not been sufficiently used for collective efforts.
This has been one of the minor bones of contention in the Brics association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and SA, for example. Successive Brics communiqués have noted the need to reform the Security Council, but no activity has taken place due to the competing interests. Similarly, pledges by China to its African counterparts to advance the case for permanent African representation on the Security Council have gone nowhere.
There is no doubt that one of the obstacles to achieving Security Council membership has been competing interests within Africa itself. The designation of one or, as desired, two permanent seats for the African continent is only one phase of the process. Next comes the question of who should occupy such a seat. Would the deciding factor be economic size? Might that not reproduce the very inequality being argued against? Power is another consideration. Every regional leader on the continent, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and SA, would be inclined to want a seat for itself.
One potential route is that of rotating seats on the Security Council for the continent. That is, two seats would be preserved for the AU, which would decide on the countries to occupy them and for what duration. This would be consistent with the UN Charter, whose article 51 already recognises a role for regional actors. Indeed, the AU has already taken some measures which would fit within such a framework, most prominently the AU Peace and Security Council.
Advocating for Security Council reform may be a fool’s errand. As early as the 1960s (with the UN in only its second decade), US political scientist Inis Claude jnr observed in his book The Changing United Nations that the greatest force for change in the institution was power, not principle. More could be learnt about the UN’s direction from its donor statements than from its charter. Yet it is precisely because of its apparent hopelessness that reform is necessary. The organisation still represents the best of what humanity can accomplish, but it needs refining.
• Dr Ndzendze is senior lecturer and head of department: politics and international relations at the University of Johannesburg. His latest book is The Political Economy of Sino-South African Trade and Regional Competition (Palgrave Macmillan).
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