South Africa does not have a democracy problem, but rather a democratic governance one. And this challenge cannot be solved by normal political means.
Is South Africa in 2024 like it was before 1994, when the country stood on the brink of implosion — socially, economically and politically? South Africa in 2024 has features of the developed world, with its privileges and excesses, simultaneously coexisting with those of the developing world, with its many privations. South Africa in 2024 remains a country of “two nations” — the rich minority and the poor majority, the former in safe zones and the latter in dangerous, combustible ones.
Alongside the Third World’s evils of chronic socioeconomic underdevelopment, high unemployment, deep poverty and extreme inequality, South Africa also has high levels of extreme criminality, including rape (including that of children and the elderly), murder and gender-based violence. In short, incivility and inhumanity are rife, as is a widespread culture of impunity.
Those in power appear to deploy it without any responsibility, while those with authority exercise it without any accountability. In addition to contradictory and inappropriate policies undermining redistribution and development, South Africa is faced with a serious erosion of public ethics.
Along with a poor work ethic — especially in the public service — the country is faced with a corrosive and corrupt corporate sector. In addition, maladministration and malfeasance, fostered by an aimless politics and poor governance, are rife. Given these realities, it is unsurprising that corruption and state capture were so easily achieved. There is an urgent need for social and economic recovery through rebuilding public institutions and rehabilitating politics. A capable meritocratic civil service is desperately required.
There is the spectre of the past in the present. In 1990, South Africa faced the prospect of prolonged instability and crisis, and for this reason a negotiated settlement was unavoidable. A government of national unity (GNU) was a necessity, even if it was a product of political contingency. The GNU, albeit short-lived, created a fundamentally new economic, social and political order. What followed was a new set of norms and a fresh range of inclusive political and institutional infrastructures to support them.
Can it be credibly argued that South Africa in 2024 is at a point similar to where it was in 1994? Is a GNU required, and can the institutions and systems established after 1994 to support democratic governance be questioned?
While the credibility of the government and its operations after 1994 may certainly be at issue, is its legitimacy equally at stake? It is no secret that South Africa in 2024 is shaped by its colonial and apartheid past. But contemporary South Africa is also plagued by a rootless and dishonest politics, led by bipolar political parties unresponsive to societal needs. They appear to pursue a valueless and constantly shifting politics without any allegiance to principle. The factionalism within and between political parties is giving rise to minority governments and “coalitions” that serve little public purpose other than allowing political entities access to political office for venal purposes.
The track record of “coalitions” in local government makes for dismal reading, characterised as it is by skulduggery, infighting, brinkmanship and governmental collapse. Instead of 1994, at times it appears South Africa resembles George Orwell’s 1984. Disconnected and socially distant political parties pretend they “represent” societal interests, when in fact a crisis of credibility in representation and responsiveness has engulfed them, accompanied by an ideological vacuum in which each appears to have no politics, cause or belief.
The result is impunity in the exercise of power and authority, informality in decision-making and governance, the breakdown of oversight, and little to no accountability. This has resulted in development being undermined, leading to worsening inequality and growing instability, especially in local government. But if a magic wand were to be waved and the political crisis miraculously resolved, would South Africa suddenly make a miraculous recovery?
The last decade-and-a-half has seen the ruling party embroiled in a malaise that has precipitated and perpetuated inappropriate policy, debilitating maladministration and malfeasance, malevolent state capture, and the development of a cosy relationship with a predatory political governance and corporate business elite
The reality is that South Africa would continue to be bedevilled by a myriad problems. This is the curious oddity that is South Africa, where abnormality masquerades as the norm. In the short term, a GNU would be the safest, most stable way out of this quagmire.
Leaving political parties and politicians to pursue the predatory anti-politics they have been engaging in will only deepen the crisis of unrepresentative and unresponsive institutions. A GNU may help to rein in this tendency. In its absence, a vacuum will be left in which politicians will be able to pursue their own narrow self-serving agendas unrestrained by citizen demands for responsiveness and accountability.
Coalitions in large metros with huge budgets, vast procurement and big public spending have demonstrated they are no better at governing than those in smaller towns and cities. One brittle formation is constantly competing against another equally fragile one. Coalitions have been characterised by one-upmanship, fragmentation and a lack of respect for agreements. An obsession with litigious politics is the order of the day. Mistrust reigns supreme.
This state of affairs has rendered governance in coalition metros susceptible to uncertainty and ambiguity. Institutional performance, oversight, accountability and responsiveness have been surrendered to the unrestrained baser instincts of politicians, reducing politics to petty point-scoring, rather than publicly deliberated problem-solving. Given South Africa’s current socioeconomic crisis, no party can be trusted to be in government on its own. Perhaps for proper government South Africa needs a grand coalition or, more preferably, a GNU.
The last decade-and-a-half has seen the ruling party embroiled in a malaise that has precipitated and perpetuated inappropriate policy, debilitating maladministration and malfeasance, malevolent state capture, and the development of a cosy relationship with a predatory political governance and corporate business elite. Together they have unleashed endemic social pathologies.
Where the DA governs, similar impulses are apparent.
For the sake of social stability, social solidarity, institutional integrity and socioeconomic advancement, there should be a GNU made up of all parties with electoral support above a 10% threshold. Each party should be allocated portfolios in the executive in proportion to its support, to usher in an immediate short-term solution that will allow the country to move away from politicised uncertainty and fragmentation. If such parties are unwilling to co-operate, the largest party should extend invitations to join the GNU to smaller ones that are.
There is a need to think beyond the “short-term” acquisition of political power and focus on the longer-term management and administration of it. To achieve this paradigmatic shift, there needs to be a GNU to stabilise and reset public institutions.
Policywise, a detailed minimum programme of redistributive cross-subsidisation should form the basic agreement underpinning a GNU. Imagine if the National Health Insurance (NHI) had been crafted by a broader coalition or a GNU. If that had been the case, would the policy be receiving the unworthy praise or the unmerited vilification it is now being subjected to?
Our bet is that, if it had been crafted with wider consensus, it would have more widespread support. The NHI could have been better designed for cost containment, administrative efficiency and prudent management through a more inclusive approach.
That said, we cannot be blind to the notable risks of a GNU. For starters, such a governance mechanism creates new mythologies about the need for a transitional mechanism out of the current quagmire, which is the result of poor government, rather than a dramatic shift in the social order. South Africa's crisis of representation and responsiveness will not be solved simply by setting up a new parliament on a business-as-usual basis.
A GNU, for all its advantages, may unintentionally continue to incentivise a closing of ranks among the political elite, or alternatively unleash competition that could result in outright conflict or obstructionism in government between the constituent parties, leading to inefficiency and instability. Accountability itself may be deferred and displaced, instead of enhanced, resulting in blame games and the participating parties shirking their responsibilities.
The short-term benefits of a GNU may prove unsustainable in the face of challenging and persistent latent tensions and fundamental disagreements. All these risks notwithstanding, there is far more to gain from a flawed GNU than continuing with an overzealous, vicious politics of division and conflict thinly disguised as competition.
To quote the old saying, united we stand, but divided we fall. After the 2024 elections, government must be about joint responsibility and accountability. Parties need to demonstrate commitment to principle, act with courage and display leadership. They must place the interests South Africa before their own narrow party-political ones.
• Fakir is a consulting election analyst at the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa and a research associate of the Centre for African Diplomacy and Leadership (CADL) at the University of Johannesburg (UJ).
• Landsberg is a professor at UJ and the director or CADL, as well as the South African Research Chairs Initiative chair of African diplomacy and foreign policy
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