Vexed geopolitical issues likely to create fault lines in new SA administration

In a vibrant multiparty democracy such as exists in South Africa, almost all policy issues are fiercely contested by political parties along ideological lines. Foreign policy, far from being the exception to the rule, is an area where it is expected intense contestation will occur in a coalition government. This is because a country’s foreign policy is a reflection of how its leaders define the nation’s interests and identity, and these are often grounded in the leadership’s ideological orientation.

In 2022, the leader of the DA travelled to Ukraine to show his party’s solidarity with that country’s government after it was invaded by Russia. This trip was in defiance of the then ANC-led South African government’s declaration of neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war and its refusal to condemn Russia’s actions. In the Israel-Palestine war, the ANC has been one of the staunchest supporters of Palestine, while the DA has said it is neutral regarding the conflict, and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) has professed its support for Israel. On Zimbabwe, both the EFF and the DA have been outspoken in their criticism of the Zanu-PF regime, which has long been accused of human rights violations, while the ANC has adopted a largely cordial approach towards our northern neighbour.

In 2016, the DA’s Solly Msimanga, who was then the mayor of Tshwane, visited Taiwan, which the ANC angrily labelled an act of treason, given that it went against the government’s support for the One-China policy. Moreover, while the ANC celebrated South Africa hosting the Brics summit in August 2023 as a diplomatic triumph, the DA dismissed the gathering as a waste of money and lamented that the “prioritisation of organised international networks will continue to threaten our democracy and our safety”.

These limited examples highlight just how polarised South African parties are on foreign policy issues and expose how fundamentally different their views are on South Africa’s identity and role in the world. The outcome of the May 29 elections — which saw the ANC lose its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1994, securing just 40.2% of the vote — suggests the future of South African foreign policy has now suddenly become uncertain. The new government will have to grapple with an increasingly complex geopolitical environment and somehow find a way of advancing and protecting South Africa’s interests. Whatever the outcome of the power-sharing negotiations the various political parties are now engaged in, the ANC’s ability to make foreign policy decisions without consulting opposition parties or considering their input will henceforth be curtailed.

The prominence of Brics and China in South Africa’s foreign policy will be challenged by the pro-West DA should it be part of the new administration, but it will unlikely possess the political muscle to change the foreign policy direction 

There are concerns the ANC has already lost one of its key foreign policy levers — in the form of its parliamentary majority. In previous administrations, the ANC could count on its MPs to toe the party line, and the party could use its majority to ratify international treaties and agreements entered into by the government with minimal scrutiny. In a coalition, minority or national unity government with a hung parliament, ratifying an international treaty can be done only by lobbying other parties, which may necessitate all parties having to make compromises. Furthermore, the parliamentary portfolio committee on international relations and co-operation, another critical accountability body tasked with scrutinising the government’s foreign policy decisions, will no longer be under the control of a single party. The government may, for the first time in the post-apartheid era, have to answer tough questions from the committee without having a majority of its MPs on the panel.

Moreover, a coalition government may see a party other than the ANC presiding over the department of international relations & co-operation (Dirco), which is responsible for co-ordinating the country’s foreign policy. This would lead to a significant change in South Africa’s foreign policy posture, not least because of the appointment of new personnel with different ideological inclinations in key positions such as ambassadorships. Even if the ANC retains control of Dirco, its decisions and actions would still have to be approved by a multiparty cabinet, which will not be as easy as winning the approval of a single-party cabinet. These are valid concerns that may arise from a coalition government. However, the ANC will remain in the driver’s seat as the ruling majority party with the final say over foreign policy in cases where there is a stalemate or lack of consensus. In negotiations towards a unity government, it is important the ANC continues to lead the way in terms of national and foreign policy decisions, in consultation with its coalition partners.

Over the last three decades, the ANC government has steadfastly pursued an Afrocentric and Global South-focused foreign policy. Consequently, the country has been involved in addressing peace and security issues in Africa, as well as fostering regional and continental integration. To avoid being seen as an interventionist wannabe continental hegemonic power, South Africa has adopted a largely muted stance on human rights violations taking place in other African countries. For example, the ANC government did not publicly condemn human rights abuses committed by the Zimbabwean government in accordance with its infamous “quiet diplomacy” approach. While Pretoria prioritising Africa in its foreign policy will certainly continue under the new dispensation, owing to its obvious practical benefits, South Africa may well become more vocal in calling out human rights abuses taking place across the continent.

The South African government has also decisively turned towards the East in its foreign policy, cultivating close relations with countries such as Russia and China, and joining Brics in 2010. South Africa’s optimal geopolitical position in a rapidly changing world where economic power is increasingly shifting from West to East will continue to be the subject of fierce debate. However, we should not expect a radical departure from a road already well charted. The prominence of Brics and China in South Africa’s foreign policy will be challenged by the pro-West DA should it be part of the new administration, but it will unlikely possess the political muscle to change the foreign policy direction.

It is inconceivable that South Africa will turn towards the West, even under the influence of the DA, particularly on the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts. Moreover, Brics is more about the economic wellbeing of South Africa than anything else. Most importantly, despite fierce competition and political differences between parties on the Left, the ANC’s ideological agenda and its pan-Africanist and Global South vision is shared by the EFF and the MK Party, guided by crucial ANC historical documents the Programme of Action (1949) and the Freedom Charter (1955). The two tracts are the ideological foundations of not only the ANC, but also black political parties such as the EFF and the MK Party more broadly. The documents are revered in South Africa’s liberation history and provide a clear vision of the country’s place in the world. They emphasise the unity and solidarity of all oppressed groups, and underline the importance of alliances with other anti-apartheid organisations. Accordingly, these documents remain pivotal for South Africa’s geopolitical positioning. 

Foreign policy is not just a topic of academic interest, as it has a direct impact on South Africa’s economic wellbeing and national security. Hence, parties must try to find common ground on key foreign policy issues to avoid incoherence and time-wasting squabbles. The world will not wait for South Africa to put its house in order. The vision and aspirations for South Africa are clear and well charted, and therefore the ANC as the majority party in the upcoming coalition must lead in consultation with its partners in driving forward its agenda.

• Monyae is the director of the Centre for Africa-China Studies at the University of Johannesburg