South Africa’s military is at a crossroads. The fall of Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other setbacks faced by South African forces there have exposed deep flaws in the country’s defence capabilities. Once hailed as a regional powerhouse, the SANDF now grapples with outdated equipment, chronic underfunding and an inability to modernise effectively.
While the army — as opposed to the navy and air force — retains a broad structure on paper, over-reliance on reserve forces, ageing stockpiles and stalled procurement programmes have left it struggling to meet its commitments.
With the regular force having to rotate personnel to meet increasing commitments, the SANDF has often had to call up reserve forces to fill gaps. In the first six months of the financial 2025, the SANDF had already used 1,803,690 of the planned 1,997,872 reserve force man-days for the year. This is not only due to an expanding mandate, but to a bloated and unfit structure.
In 1998 the then minister of defence Joe Modise initiated the arms procurement programme to modernise the navy and air force. The army was left out of the programme due to its inherited stockpile, which was relatively new at the time.
Of the four frigates, the lead ship, SAS Amatola, is currently on coastal deployment until the end of March. SAS Isandlwana is undergoing maintenance in Durban, which is scheduled to be completed in October. SAS Spioenkop and SAS Mendi remain in Simon’s Town, with SAS Mendi dry-docked.
Three submarines were procured from Germany. Currently, one is semi-operational, one is dry-docked and the third is undergoing an overdue maintenance programme, which has been delayed due to scarce funding.
Of the four Lynx helicopters, two are active currently. One was used to ferry the chief of the South African Air Force (SAAF) to his golf day at Copperleaf Estate in Centurion on Tuesday.
Thirty helicopters were procured from AgustaWestland, and have been used to carry troops, special forces operatives and VIP personnel. Additionally, the helicopters can serve as airborne command posts. To date, three have been written off, and a further three have possibly been cannibalised for parts. The total number flying is not certain, but at least six are active.
Two dozen Hawk 120 trainer jets were procured from BAE Systems. The Hawks were also meant to augment the 26 Swedish-manufactured Gripen fighter jets in ground attack and combat air support. As of January, at least six were active, possibly eight.
Out in the Northern Cape, among the diesel and dust at Combat Training Centre Lohatlha, hundreds of Ratels, Casspirs, Mambas and Olifant tanks sit in the open air, rusting away with open hatches
The status of the Gripen fleet has been controversial in recent years, with reporting in 2022 stating that the entire fleet was grounded, with no support contract. A three-year support contract was signed in September 2022, intended to support 13 of the original 26. However, evidence suggests only five, possibly six, were returned to active status, and the support contract expires in October, putting the fleet at risk again. A presentation from Armscor to parliament noted that delays in receiving spares was a key issue.
Upon its establishment, the SANDF inherited a large stockpile of equipment from its predecessor, which included more than 1,000 Ratel infantry fighting vehicles and almost 3,000 armoured personnel carriers, namely the Casspir and Mamba. However, all these were manufactured in the 1980s, and several hundred were sold off to foreign customers.
Additionally, much of the fleet was placed in storage, and the condition of many has deteriorated. Out in the Northern Cape, among the diesel and dust at Combat Training Centre Lohatlha, hundreds of Ratels, Casspirs, Mambas and Olifant tanks sit in the open air, rusting away with open hatches.
The mainstay of the helicopter fleet, the Oryx, stands at 39 airframes. In the beginning of 2024, only two helicopters were active, but by October last year, a total of eight were active. The rest of the fleet remains grounded. A 2023 report from then minister, Thandi Modise, stated that R2.1bn was needed to return the fleet to service.
The role of long-range aerial logistics has been filled by the C130B/BZ Hercules, the first of which entered service in 1963. In 1997, the fleet was expanded from seven to 12 aircraft, through the US government’s “excess defence articles” programme. Today, almost all are grounded, with at least four airframes sitting idle at Waterkloof. One is undergoing modernisation in the UK, at a cost of about £20m (R460m), with a second being modernised by Denel Aviation. The SAAF received a budget of R1bn from the Treasury for this.
The Ratel, which proved capable and effective during the 1980s, was more than 20 years old when its replacement (the Badger) was commissioned by Armscor under Project Hoefyster in 2007. Initially meant to partially replace the Ratel, an order was placed for 264 units at a cost of about R8.5bn. However, almost 18 years later, not a single vehicle has been handed over, and the army has moved to defer the project, partly due to suspected corruption. The army does not have the funds to complete the project, and Denel’s ability to manufacture the vehicles is highly doubtful anyway.
One of the biggest failures lies in the department of defence’s perpetual inability to implement policy and the promises of committed defence spending.
Over the past 15 years, the SANDF has received substantial budget cuts, which have seen defence spending drop to 0.7%, the lowest in the history of the South African armed forces. The financial predicament has been exacerbated by personnel costs, which have remained static, while operational costs and foreign deployments rose.
Over time, the lack of funding meant stocks of spare parts and ammunition dried up. Every category of equipment is suffering from severe availability, serviceability and obsolescence issues.
Once our troops are brought back from the DRC, questions must be answered and leadership must be held accountable. It is time to rebuild our defence force and implement the countless lessons that have been learnt but ignored, especially after the Battle of Bangui in 2013. A new defence review must be commissioned, to take a hard look at the current state of the military, future threats and foreign policy objectives, and then structure the defence force accordingly.
• Ricardo Teixeira is a journalist and defence analyst specialising in national security and global strategic affairs. He contributes to DefenceWeb and is a junior editor at ProtectionWeb.
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