A bloody week of fighting around Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has seen South Africa suffer its greatest loss of troops in combat in more than a decade, with 13 soldiers killed. Dozens more were injured, with some requiring amputations. Not since the March 2013 Battle of Bangui in the Central African Republic — where 15 soldiers died — has the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) had such a difficult time — but the ordeal for soldiers on the ground is far from over as they remain under rebel control and are essentially being held as prisoners of war.
The fall of Goma — capital of the DRC’s North Kivu province — to Rwanda-backed M23 rebels is the culmination of decades of conflict in the DRC, rooted in ethnic tensions, the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide, and fighting over mineral resources. The current crisis — which threatens to spill over into a regional war — has many of its origins in the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003). After the 1994 Rwandan Genocide that killed nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus, Rwanda — supported mainly by Uganda — invaded Zaire (as the DRC was then known) to apparently defend against local militia groups and pursue Hutu militias responsible for the genocide. After ousting Mobutu Sese Seko, Laurent Kabila was installed as president of the DRC, but war broke out again in 1998 over tensions with Rwanda. Nine national armies and numerous militias fought on the DRC government’s side while others — including Rwanda and Uganda — supported anti-Kabila rebels. Although a peace agreement was signed in 2003 following the deaths of at least three million people — one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II — fighting in the DRC has continued, particularly in the east.
M23 emerges
The M23 is one of more than 100 armed groups active in the region. It began to emerge in 2004 when Tutsi militia the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) was formed by Laurent Nkunda, a former Congolese general subsequently implicated in war crimes and human rights abuses. The CNDP claimed to protect the Tutsi population in the DRC from attacks by Hutu militias.
In the following years, fighting continued until March 23 2009 when a peace agreement was signed between the DRC government and the CNDP. In April 2012, former CNDP members formed the M23 (taking their name from the March 2009 agreement), claiming that the DRC government failed to honour the peace agreement by fully integrating Tutsis into the armed forces and government. They launched an armed rebellion in North Kivu, and captured Goma in 2012. But military pressure from the DRC and foreign forces led to the defeat of the M23, which in November 2013 announced an end to fighting. The group remained largely dormant until it launched a rebellion in 2022. Peace efforts in mid-2024 failed to halt fighting. Emboldened by training and support from Rwanda and the drawdown of UN peacekeepers, the M23 in late 2024 ramped up attacks, leading to the fall of Goma in January.
The UN withdrawal
The UN has a long history of involvement in the DRC, notably the 1999 establishment of the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monuc) to monitor ceasefires. The mission was renamed Monusco in 2010 (UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
Faced with an increase in violence, in 2013 Monusco took the unusual step of establishing a Force Intervention Brigade — this is given a mandate to take offensive action against armed groups, and as such recorded success against the M23. However, the DRC last year requested the mission’s withdrawal, citing its failure to prevent attacks by the many armed groups in the eastern Congo, though political motivations played a part as well. Monusco forces had withdrawn from South Kivu by mid-2024, leaving it exposed to the latest M23 advance. With security deteriorating, the UN slowed withdrawal of its 15,000 troops, who continue to have a presence in Ituri and North Kivu provinces.
DRC President Felix Tshisekedi previously treated an East African Community (EAC) force in a similar manner — the EAC force deployed in 2022 to help bring peace, but Tshisekedi demanded its departure less than a year later.
Enter SAMIDRC
With the EAC force withdrawn and Monusco winding down, the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) from December 2023 sent troops to the DRC at Tshisekedi’s request to help the DRC military (FARDC) neutralise armed groups. The resulting SAMIDRC (Sadc Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) force has a cap of 5,000 troops, with the majority (2,900) coming from South Africa and the rest from Tanzania and Malawi, though only about 800 South African soldiers are understood to have actually been deployed. None of the other 16 members of Sadc have contributed troops, leaving South Africa to shoulder most of the burden.
Long South African presence
South Africa has engaged in more than a dozen peace missions since 1999, ranging from Sudan to the Central African Republic. Its first deployment was with Monuc, and was followed in the DRC by various bilateral agreements that saw the SANDF train and assist the FARDC. Under Operation Mistral, South Africa contributes more than 1,100 troops to Monusco as well as a Composite Helicopter Unit that operated several Oryx transport helicopters and three Rooivalk attack helicopters. The latter were first deployed to the DRC in October 2013, where they proved instrumental in bringing about the M23’s cessation of hostilities. However, due to funding cuts (both South African and UN) and the decline of the SANDF, the Rooivalks have not flown in the DRC for years and were brought home in December 2024.
Why is the SANDF in the DRC?
South Africa, as an ambitious regional powerhouse, contributes to UN, AU and other peace initiatives across Africa, and willingly supports Sadc allies like the DRC as per the regional bloc’s Mutual Defence Pact. Economic and political ties also play a role in two-way trade between the DRC and South Africa, which has been growing steadily over the years and amounts to tens of billions of rands per annum. South Africa has since 1994 had business interests in the DRC, ranging from mining operations to banking and telecoms.
Also of concern is instability in the DRC flowing south. Numerous government officials have warned that instability in the DRC could create a refugee crisis that reaches South Africa.
Rwandan intervention
Though working alongside Sadc counterparts to bring peace to Mozambique, Rwanda has for decades supported militias in the DRC, with major financial incentives from mining. Mineral exports from Rwanda now amount to more than $1bn (about R18.6bn) a year, according to researchers — double that of two years ago, with a fair chunk from the DRC as M23 rebels collect mining taxes and control mineral-producing regions.
Rwanda repeatedly denies supporting the M23, saying it is only taking “defensive measures” in the DRC, particularly against militias like the Hutu FDLR. However, the UN in 2022 stated it had solid evidence Rwandan troops were fighting alongside the M23, supplying rebels with surface-to-air missiles, guided mortars and other advanced weapons. In addition to an estimated 6,000 M23 troops, there are some 4,000 Rwandan soldiers in the DRC.
Decline of the SANDF
Thanks to Rwanda, the improvement in training and equipment on the M23 side coincides with the decline of the SANDF. The department of defence has said it is 50% underfunded compared to its mandate, and the defence budget keeps shrinking in real terms. It is less than 1% of GDP — the international average is more than 2%. For decades, experts and the SANDF have warned that the SANDF is underfunded, overstretched and battling to meet its mandates, which include border security, search and rescue, flood relief, counter-poaching activities and peacekeeping. The cracks were beginning to show during the now concluded Sadc Mission in Mozambique (Samim), where SANDF troops had minimal air support — something the Rwandan forces also deployed there no doubt keenly observed.
The government has kept increasing the SANDF’s mandate while cutting its funding and capabilities. The lack of air support, air defence systems, counter-mortar systems, artillery and other equipment in the DRC undoubtedly contributed to the deaths of the 13 soldiers this year, and the combat deaths of another six South Africans last year.
South Africa’s military and political leadership has failed the SANDF. Military leaders have generally been trying to do the best they can with the resources and equipment available, but have been reluctant to say no to the minister of defence and the president when pushed to accomplish additional tasks while being so thinly stretched.
Successive defence ministers have bemoaned the decline of the SANDF but have not refused to carry out deployments, even when they have perhaps half the resources required. Political leadership can no longer delude itself about the SANDF’s capabilities, and with the fall of Goma this means “the end of South Africa as a regional power for the next decade at least”, according to African Defence Review director Darren Olivier.
Not just the SANDF’s fault
The SANDF’s capabilities have declined while the government’s increasingly delusional ambitions have grown. But the SANDF is not solely to blame for the fall of Goma. The FARDC’s morale, training and equipment leave a lot to be desired — many government soldiers melted away and surrendered. While Monusco forces were mobilised to assist in the defence of Goma, they played a limited role. Similarly, the Tanzanian and Malawian contingents of SAMIDRC did not perform exceptionally well either. If anything, South Africa can be blamed for foolishly taking part in SAMIDRC with so little support from other African nations who seem to want little to do with the mission.
Let down by a defunded military, reluctant African allies, obstinate DRC leadership and skilful Rwandan manoeuvring, South Africa — long a defender of the “Global South” — has to admit it can no longer project hard power in the region. With no other cards to play, its only solution to the DRC fiasco is the negotiating table.
• Martin is the editor of defenceWeb
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