DRC debacle highlights need to examine SANDF underfunding

Lt-Gen Ntshavheni Maphaha’s remark at a funeral in the Free State — that politicians have turned the SANDF into a “Mickey Mouse” defence force — has drawn both condemnation and support. 

Dakota Lekgoete, chair of parliament’s portfolio committee on defence, has cautioned that such statements undermine public trust in the government and the armed forces. Conversely, the South African National Defence Union (Sandu) has fully supported Maphaha, arguing that he articulated the reality — that years of budget cuts and political indifference have left the SANDF under-resourced and overstretched. 

Maphaha’s comment is not just an emotional response to the tragic loss of soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but also reflects long-standing concerns regarding South Africa’s porous borders and the SANDF’s declining capacity. His warning underscores deeper structural issues that have plagued South Africa’s security apparatus for years, and the military’s growing frustration at what they view as political neglect — a phenomenon widely recognised in civil-military relations. 

The South African case mirrors broader global tensions, in which militaries feel restrained by political decisions, while governments struggle to maintain authority over their armed forces. 

A  well equipped, modern defence force is essential for South Africa to fulfil its regional commitments and safeguard its security. This includes the SANDF’s capacity for rapid troop and equipment deployment — for peacekeeping or defensive operations across the region — that require improved transport aircraft, naval capabilities and logistics infrastructure. 

Addressing Maphaha’s concerns would also entail bolstering border security through enhanced surveillance technology — including the use of drones and satellite monitoring. 

The DRC debacle exposes a critical issue in our governance: The extent to which civilian leaders dictate military strategy versus the degree of autonomy the military should wield in operational matters. As military scholar Kobi Michael argues, an inherent tension exists between military professionalism and civilian oversight. 

While democratic governments are expected to exercise “objective civilian control”, the military — possessing specialised knowledge — often exerts influence in strategic decisions. Parliament laid bare this friction. 

 Politicians such as Lekgoete argue the military must stay in its lane, executing directives without publicly challenging government policy. The reality is far more complex. The military often finds itself as both implementer and strategist in foreign operations — especially when political leadership lacks clarity, as evinced by parliamentary debate on the SANDF’s participation in Sadc’s mission in the DRC. 

This was an ill-considered political spectacle.  The absence of a clear and adequately resourced strategic doctrine for the SANDF’s role in peacekeeping contributes to military frustrations and raises concerns about the coherence of political oversight. Internal political discord undermines strategic military planning and affects South Africa’s standing in international forums.

Beyond the civilian-military discord, parliamentarians ask a broader question: Should we  be in the DRC in the first place? Officially, the SANDF’s deployment is part of its responsibility to contribute to regional stability, peace, and security. From 1999, South Africa has been determined to restructure continental institutions in line with our values — which also allowed the expansion of South African companies into African markets. 

However, this hegemonic perception is contradicted by domestic material weaknesses. Even as political considerations and resource allocation prioritise peace, no clear strategic framework is in place for integrating commercial diplomacy into post-conflict reconstruction and development. While South Africa is expected to take the lead, our domestic limitations — especially the underfunding of the military — constrain the effectiveness of continental security initiatives.

Meanwhile, the evacuation of injured South African soldiers from the DRC through Rwanda, despite the tense relations between the two countries, further illustrates the geopolitical entanglements of peacekeeping operations. Rwanda’s willingness to manage the evacuation corridor signals the complex web of regional power struggles in which we find ourselves.  

While some may dismiss Maphaha’s remark as insubordination, it conveys legitimate concerns about the SANDF’s operational readiness. Defence spending has consistently declined, with resources diverted to other national priorities.

Civilian oversight is a cornerstone of democracy, but it should not be exercised in a way that undermines the country’s security apparatus.

In advanced economies, defence spending as a percentage of GDP varies, with many Nato countries traditionally aiming for a minimum of 2%. Brics nations also exhibit varied commitments: Russia allocated 5.9% of its GDP to defence in 2023, India 2.4% and China a more restrained 1.7%. In contrast, South Africa’s defence budget for the same year amounted to just 0.7% of GDP. 

 The contradiction is evident in parliamentary debates. We expect a robust and professional military while depriving it of resources, resulting in an overstretched and potentially demoralised SANDF. Nevertheless, the military is tasked with carrying out extensive peacekeeping missions, securing our borders and responding to domestic security crises.

South Africa needs to reconcile its foreign policy ambitions with the military realities of investment to modernise the SANDF as part of a comprehensive economic growth agenda. 

This requires increased funding and clearer strategic directives for the economy, while ensuring we maintain a fit, combat-ready and capable force. Further, civilian-military relations need to be redefined to avert recurring tensions. Civilian oversight is a cornerstone of democracy, but it should not be exercised in a way that undermines the country’s security apparatus. Similarly, the military must address its grievances through appropriate channels rather than through public outbursts, which risk further eroding institutional credibility.

The DRC saga should prompt reforms to address the systemic failures that led to this tragedy. We have entered a phase of increased intensity in this proxy war, which threatens the region’s stability. For some, the primary objective is to inflict a decisive strategic defeat on M23. Yet, for others, the aim is regime change in Kinshasa, including dismantling external support to the regime. 

For South Africa, we must either commit to adequately supporting the SANDF, or reconsider the scope of our military engagements abroad. Anything less would be a disservice to those who wear the uniform, and to the nation’s security.

• Ngwenya  holds an MA international affairs in strategic studies, and an LLM in international and African regional law.